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The international banking crisis: effects  
and some key lessons 
Ong Chong Tee
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A.  Trends in capital flows during the crisis 
The recent increase in capital inflows to some emerging market economies (EMEs) followed 
a period of strong growth in such flows from 2002 to 2007 and then a sharp contraction 
during the global financial crisis of the past two years. Between 2002 and 2007, gross capital 
inflows to EME regions increased more than seven times in absolute terms. This was 
accompanied by an equally large increase in outflows over the same period (Chart 1). 
Chart 1 
Composition of gross capital flows in EME regions 
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The composition of gross capital flows has also changed. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
continues to be a key driver of both capital inflows and outflows but portfolio investment and 
cross-border lending flows have become more important drivers, contributing to the bulk of 
the rapid increase in capital flows between 2002 and 2007 and the sharp retrenchment in 
2008 (Chart 1). In Asia, gross capital flows continued to contract in Q1 2009. Since Q2 2009, 
however, there has been a revival of gross capital flows, as global risk appetite returned and 
Asia’s economic recovery proved sharper and faster than expected. Portfolio investment 
flows have been particularly strong. 
To the extent that capital flows reflect different economic prospects and take the form of 
long-term FDI, they contribute to economic efficiency and stability by reallocating resources 
from capital-rich to capital-deficient regions. However, as noted above, cross-border lending 
flows have become more important in EME regions in recent years. 
B.  Domestic vs cross-border financial intermediation 
Cross-border funding together with domestic financial intermediation in EMEs helps to 
integrate global financial markets by moving funds from countries with excess savings to 
those that need them. Capital markets can also play a similar role but there is a segment of 
borrowers and savers that capital markets will not be able to reach. Cross-border funding is 
also able to achieve the following benefits: 
1.  Efficiency: banks can raise funds from the most abundant (cheapest) source and 
lend to the areas with the highest demand (return). 
2.  Centralised liquidity management: banks pool liquid assets globally to avoid 
maintaining excess liquidity. To ensure that there are sufficient pooled liquid assets, 
stress tests (some specified by home regulators) are conducted. 
3.  Risk management: local funding means that they need to keep dealing, risk 
management and settlement desks in many locations. This is potentially costly. 
Local funding can be less efficient because it requires banks to set up more funding desks 
locally (with the attendant support facilities) as well as a distinct pool of liquid assets. The 
absence of financial intermediation may also create more systemic risks to the extent that it 
restricts banks’ ability to diversify their risks and creates asset bubbles in countries with 
excess savings. In broad terms, the unintended restriction of cross-border inter-regional 
flows would lead to “trapped liquidity” in surplus countries and consequent asset price 
inflation pressure in those countries. Conversely, capital-importing regions losing the benefit 
of inbound cross-border capital allocation would, over time, see increased funding costs for 
the economy as a whole, translating into lower potential trend growth. Depending on the 
specific nature of the regulatory cross-border funding safeguards, there could also be 
inadvertent limitations, or more costly capital structures, for banking groups to diversify their 
exposure to different geographical and asset markets. 
However, it should be acknowledged that cross-border funding, as demonstrated by the 
international banking crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, can involve maturity 
and currency mismatches that should be monitored. Banks should, for example, be required 
to conduct rigorous stress tests on their liquidity needs. This would help to reduce 
idiosyncratic risk that could otherwise pose systemic challenges. However, because 
idiosyncratic risk cannot be reduced to zero, even if regulations are tightened sharply, central 
banks may have to consider the use of cross-border central bank facilities to mitigate 
extreme events.   BIS Papers No 54  361
 
 
C.  Differences in addressing idiosyncratic and systemic tail risk 
The matrix below is one illustration of how risks and implications could be categorised in 





Anecdotal evidence suggests that the cross-funding market generally, and the foreign 
exchange (FX) swap market in particular, did not seize up for endogenous reasons. There 
was a distinct upstream trigger arising from the impairment of banks’ assets, which resulted 
in a breakdown in credit lines, leading in turn to a scramble to secure funding in collateralised 
markets such as the FX swap market. Initiatives are therefore currently being developed by 
regulatory colleagues to ratchet up measures to manage individual financial institutions’ (FI) 
idiosyncratic risk.  
Better management of institution-specific risk is important. By definition, however, 
idiosyncratic risk cannot be uniform from one institution to another. As such, to limit the 
probability of any institution entering distress to a near zero or even negligible likelihood 
would require the substantial tightening of regulatory measures. While the appropriate 
magnitude of such measures is for competent authorities to address, it is important to note 
that even a sharp tightening of measures targeted at idiosyncratic risk cannot reduce the 
probability of the incidence of a system-wide event to zero. 
This can be seen in the domestic context where each jurisdiction imposes capital and 
liquidity requirements on relevant FIs. Despite this, there is broad consensus that a back-
stop in the form of the pertinent central bank’s lender of last resort function is still necessary 
and indeed crucial. Taking the analogy to a cross-border setting, the lesson learned is that, 
beyond cross-border regulatory collaboration and international FI group-wide supervision, 
improved policy instruments are needed to act as a back-stop to address cross-border or 
cross-currency systemic risk events.  
D.  Key lessons learned from the international banking crisis – the 
need for a cross-border policy back-stop 
There are three non-mutually exclusive options that central banks can consider adopting in 
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a.  use of official foreign reserve (OFR) assets; 
b.  FX swap lines between central banks;   
c.  cross-border collateralisation arrangements between central banks. 
Deployment of foreign reserve assets 
Central banks with foreign reserve assets were able to channel some liquidity into the FX 
swap markets during the crisis. This was achieved by making USD available through FX 
swaps in routine market operations, as in Singapore’s case, or by putting in place non-
routine facilities accessible to market participants in need. This is helpful in ameliorating 
liquidity needs but is ultimately limited to OFR resources.  
One issue that has arisen concerns the potential for unintended signals. Using OFR to 
improve market liquidity essentially involves a redistribution of USD and other foreign 
currency placements among market operation counterparties or otherwise determined 
eligible participants. This takes care of idiosyncratic needs but does not change the net 
supply of foreign currency liquidity in the system as a whole. The concern is that the market 
could misinterpret the central bank’s redistribution of its foreign currency deposits among its 
counterparties as a statement regarding the creditworthiness of one or more FIs.  
There is also a balancing of objectives between the OFR’s purpose, on the one hand, as a 
balance of payments item to be used for intervention in managing FX market volatility with a 
view to macroeconomic stability, and, on the other hand, as a tapped item to be lent to 
support foreign currency liquidity. Analysts could choose to interpret the latter usage as 
circumscribing a jurisdiction’s ability to deploy OFR for the former purpose.  
FX swap lines 
Experience has shown that the establishment of currency swap arrangements in the course 
of 2008 made a decisive difference in calming cross-border liquidity requirements. Prior to 
that, major central banks’ auction mechanisms to inject USD liquidity into the market had 
successfully eased some of the USD Libor strain, but the liquidity remained largely within 
each centre.  
By allowing other central banks in different time zones to swap their currencies in order to 
obtain USD liquidity to lend to a wider pool of banks on a collateralised basis, USD liquidity 
strains were more successfully addressed across time zones. The observation, and 
subsequent private sector feedback, was that even the assurance of access to USD liquidity 
in itself in the Asian dollar market was sufficient to bolster market confidence and smoothen 
volatility. This was important from the experience gained during the crisis, whereby fragile 
sentiment could flow into European time, and aggressive funding needs that were not 
sufficiently allayed could have a snowball effect as the global trading day progressed. 
Cross-border collateralisation arrangements 
Another policy instrument being explored in various forms by certain central banks is cross-
border collateralisation arrangements. Such arrangements involve central bank A in 
jurisdiction A providing its domestic currency liquidity to an FI against collateral placed by 
that bank’s headquarters (or collateral-rich branch) in jurisdiction B, to be held in central bank 






In essence, this allows central banks the additional policy instrument of providing a back-stop 
cross-border bridge to support funding requirements in either jurisdiction in the event that 
interbank cross-border intermediation becomes impaired. This has the added advantage of 
giving both central banks access to “private market information” on where the strain in cross-
border flows might be, at the point at which an FI accesses the facility, which can be made 













Central Bank Foreign 
Currency 
Security 
Foreign 
Currency 
Security
Domestic 
Currency 